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STATES OF RESISTANCE: THE REAL ID ACT
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS UPON FEDERAL
DEPUTIZATION OF STATE AGENCIES IN
THE REGULATION OF NON-CITIZENS
Shirley Lin*
INTRODUCTION
Present-day conceptions of states’ rights hardly evoke associa-
tions with non-citizens’ rights in the United States.  Yet currently,
all fifty states have taken up a war of attrition over whether the
federal government can require them to enact sweeping and pro-
hibitively expensive changes to their driver’s licensing practices
through state departments of motor vehicles (“DMVs”).  These
changes, mandated four years ago under legislation known as the
“REAL ID Act,”1 are primarily designed to bar undocumented im-
migrants from receiving DMV-issued identification cards (“IDs”);
require that only distinctly marked forms of state identification be
issued to certain categories of non-citizens with legal presence in
the United States; create a fully interconnected fifty-state motorist
database; and embed new security features into motorist IDs.
States’ fierce opposition to the measure—developed within and
juxtaposed against the wholly federalist framework of U.S. immi-
gration law—may offer a legal foothold in the debate over the
proper role, if any, of states in immigration enforcement.  The con-
troversy over the REAL ID Act may yield one of the first viable legal
challenges to the array of irrational and structurally flawed policies
through which the federal government has sought to deputize state
apparata for immigration enforcement purposes after the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
This Article applies a legal and political analysis of the
problems that consistently arise whenever states actively “police”
the citizenship of their residents, and proceeds outside of the con-
servative/progressive dichotomy in “states’ rights” debates.  In-
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, City University of New York School of Law; B.A.,
Dartmouth College.  I would like to thank my husband Ken Lee, whose love and con-
tinual encouragement has made endeavors such as this article possible.  I am also
indebted to my family, and to my classmates and professors at CUNY School of Law
for their generous support and inspiration.
1 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C. (2006)).
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stead, the common concern underlying the states’ rights and
immigrants’ rights opposition to the REAL ID Act is the elusiveness
of political accountability.  The REAL ID Act originated as a
standalone bill to introduce changes that purport to disrupt terror-
ist travel and prevent another 9/11-type terrorist attack; the bill
passed the House but failed to pass the Senate in 2004.2  Then,
under a legislative compromise Congressional leaders imposed the
Act upon the states with minimal debate in the Senate by guaran-
teeing its attachment to an unrelated, must-pass appropriations
bill.3  In 2005, the REAL ID Act was inserted into a bill funding the
war in Iraq and aid for tsunami victims in Southeast Asia.4
Immigration law has played the stepchild to foreign policy, la-
bor policy, economic policy, and social services for more than cen-
tury, generating federal policies (and politics) regarding non-
citizens that are in continuous flux and typically fail to provide
clear guidance to states.5  The REAL ID Act and other post-9/11
policies signaled a critical shift in the post-1890s conception of im-
migration law and policy, traditionally seen as completely federal
in jurisdiction and exclusive of state interference.6  During the ad-
ministration of President George W. Bush, the century-old pre-
sumption that immigration is essentially a federal foreign policy
concern, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of states, has been
undermined by recent efforts to bureaucratically restructure immi-
gration within a new Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),
the agency responsible for recent state-by-state “federation” (or na-
tionalization) of traditional state functions and personnel.7  In the
2 Rep. James Sensenbrenner introduced the bill in an effort to implement more
general recommendations from the 9/11 Commission for improving travel security
and preventing ID fraud. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.;
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 383–90 (Norton 2004).
3 Nicole Gaouette, National ID Requirements Postponed Under Criticism, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2007, at A16.
4 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (2005)
[hereinafter REAL ID Act].
5 See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immi-
gration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2008); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 1–14 (2004) (also examining the role of
race in U.S. immigration policy).
6 See discussion infra Part I.
7 On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security assumed operational
control of a wide cross-section of functions, including intelligence operations and the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (formerly housed within the Department of
Justice).  “The nature of American society and the structure of American governance
make it impossible to achieve the goal of a secure homeland through federal Execu-
tive Branch action alone. . . . The Department of Homeland Security would coordi-
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absence of stringent equal protection and due process safeguards
against discriminatory governmental policies that target non-citi-
zens and undocumented immigrants, the residual nature of states’
authority over its non-citizen residents raises viable Tenth Amend-
ment concerns when poorly designed, Congressionally-imposed
policies of this kind fail.8
As a federal administrative agency, DHS is paying dearly for
Congress’ failure to fully debate the requirements of the REAL ID
Act.  Implementation of the licensing requirements will affect all
fifty-six U.S. jurisdictions, more than 240 million applicants for and
holders of state driver’s licenses, and is estimated to more than
double DMV workloads (a 132% increase, according to industry
estimates).9  To date, lawmakers in forty-two states have considered
legislation asserting their opposition to the REAL ID Act or urging
Congress to amend or repeal the Act.  As of April 2008, opposition
measures passed in twenty-one of those states’ legislatures, seven of
which expressly forbid their state from complying with REAL ID,
while a mere five states have passed bills allowing compliance with
REAL ID10 despite the fact that the federal government clearly an-
ticipated closer to fifty states would do so.  Not a single state has
become fully compliant with its requirements.
Within DHS, implementation of the REAL ID Act has also ab-
sorbed implementation of a related mandate, the Western Hemi-
sphere Travel Initiative (“WHTI”), which encourages border states
to develop and issue a first-in-kind hybrid driver’s license and bor-
der-crossing card known as an “enhanced driver’s license”
(“EDL”).11  DHS warned of new burdens upon tourism and border-
nate, simplify, and where appropriate consolidate government relations on its issues
for America’s state and local agencies.” PRES. GEORGE W. BUSH, THE DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY 16 (June 2002) available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.
pdf. See, e.g., the 287(g) program, discussion infra Part I.C. See also ICE Operations,
http://www.ice.gov/about/operations.htm (describing Office of State/Local Coordi-
nation and Operation Secure Communities).
8 See TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005: LE-
GAL, REGULATORY, AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 6–8 (2008).
9 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable
by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5286 (Jan. 29, 2008).
10 The Impact of Implementation: A Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative, Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Mgmt., the
Fed. Workforce, & the District of Columbia, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (statement of Rep.
Donna Stone, Del. General Assembly, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures) [herein-
after NCSL Congressional Testimony 2008].
11 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
Title VII, § 7209, (2004), 118 Stat. 3823, as amended by Pub. L. 109-295, Title V,
§ 546, (2006), 120 Stat. 1383; and Pub. L. 110-53, Title VII, § 723, (2007), 121 Stat.
349.
332 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:329
state trade unless states and Canadian provinces worked with the
federal agency to develop and issue EDLs.12  Coincidentally, fed-
eral certification of EDL compliance essentially requires (and ac-
celerates) state agency compliance with REAL ID Act standards.13
The goal of this Article is to discuss the justiciability of issues
arising under immigration federalism by examining the constitu-
tionality of the REAL ID Act.  Part I discusses states’ authority over
non-citizens and the history of “immigration federalism” jurispru-
dence.  Part II explores key provisions of the REAL ID Act, the
WHTI, and similar attempts by the federal government to deputize
states to engage in citizenship-policing and immigration enforce-
ment.  It describes the acute social and economic segregation that
the denial of driver’s licenses to non-citizens engenders, and exam-
ines a number of theories that attempt to capture the impact of the
current immigration federalism framework or prescribe alternate
approaches.  Part III analyzes previous legal challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause involving similar measures, and the viabil-
ity of potential challenges under the Tenth Amendment and inter-
national human rights laws.  The Tenth Amendment discussion in
particular elaborates on the “dual sovereignty” framework for fed-
eralism in the immigration context that the Supreme Court articu-
lated in Printz v. United States,14 and questions the fate of future
Congressional legislation that may be described as irrational, xeno-
phobic, and untethered to political accountability.
I. STATE AUTHORITY OVER NON-CITIZEN “ALIENS”: “IMMIGRATION
FEDERALISM” JURISPRUDENCE
The passage of the REAL ID Act and the creation of a pass-
port-like driver’s license signals the federal government’s recogni-
tion that its capacity and jurisdiction over the movement of non-
12 According to then-Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, DHS
would “develop a glide path to get this implemented in a way that gets it done in real
time but doesn’t jam it in a way that causes an enormous amount of disruption. . . .
But we will need cooperation from others.  Early planning on travel and early applica-
tions are going to make this process smoother.  And of course working with states and
getting alternatives in terms of drivers’ licenses is going to make it less expensive and
more convenient for travelers.”  Press Release, Department of Homeland Security,
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Press Conference on the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative Land and Sea Notice of Proposed Rule Making (June
20, 2007) available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1182430462235.shtm.
13 NCSL Congressional Testimony 2008, supra note 10, at 8 (warning that “DHS seems
to conflate REAL ID and WHTI, blurring lines between the programs, and encourag-
ing states who have legislatively opposed REAL ID to implement REAL ID by way of
WHTI-compliant IDs.”).
14 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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citizens is largely limited to its power to regulate their status and
movement between countries, and that its power does not logisti-
cally extend to their movement within and between the several
states of the United States.  Federal attempts to overcome this limi-
tation via political channels is apparent in coercive legislation such
as the REAL ID Act and opt-in initiatives such as DHS’s revitalized
section 287(g) program to train and deputize state and local law
enforcement officials to enforce immigration law.15
In practice, federal authority over the day-to-day lives of non-
citizens is “essentially interstitial,” such that “the lives and affairs of
foreign nationals and the transnational business of citizens remains
largely subject to state laws and legal institutions.”16  States—and by
extension, localities—are responsible for critical areas of daily pub-
lic life, including schools, the workplace, public health, policing,
and professional licensing.17  The role of state laws in addressing
immigration concerns has grown in recent years: in 2007, the num-
ber of enacted state laws addressing immigration was 240, approxi-
mately three times the number of such laws in 2006.18  The
numbers are even more startling at earlier stages in the political
process: 1,562 immigration-related state bills were introduced na-
tionwide in 2007,19 an increase of 174% over 2006.20  In 2007, the
three most commonly enacted immigration-related laws involved
identification/licenses (40), employment (29), and public benefits
(33).21  Although the reach of states’ authority in this area has vac-
illated largely in response to national sovereignty concerns, the
REAL ID Act represents a clear political shift within the Executive
branch and factions within Congress to now expand it.
During the nation’s infancy, immigration policies were han-
dled by individual states, without major federal intervention until
15 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
16 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. Claren-
don Press 2002).
17 Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 581 (2008).
18 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2007 Enacted State Legislation Related
to Immigrants and Immigration (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007
Immigrationfinal.pdf [hereinafter State Immigration Legislation 2007]; cf. Nat’l Confer-
ence of State Legislatures, 2006 State Legislation related to Immigration: Enacted and
Vetoed, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/6ImmigEnactedLegis3.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2009) [hereinafter State Immigration Legislation 2006].
19 State Immigration Legislation 2007, supra note 18.
20 Cf. id.; State Immigration Legislation 2006, supra note 18.
21 State Immigration Legislation 2007, supra note 18.
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the 1798 Alien and Sedition Laws.22  Since then, the Supreme
Court has established and maintained a “federal exclusivity” princi-
ple asserting that immigration law is the sole province of the fed-
eral government.  The notion that states may not regulate or
interfere with federal immigration policy was illustrated early on in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (“The Chinese Exclusion Case”),
where in 1889 the Court held that Congressional control over im-
migration—described as “the power of exclusion of foreigners”—
was an essential component of national sovereignty.23  Congress’s
plenary power over immigration has some textual support in the
Constitution, to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”24  But
one commentator has noted that the Court’s sweeping claim of ex-
clusive federal power in The Chinese Exclusion Case—reaching be-
yond issues of naturalization—could itself violate the Tenth
Amendment’s guarantee that “the powers not delegated to the
United States are reserved to the states.”25
Federal exclusivity over immigration policies, laws, and the
regulation of aliens within U.S. borders remained, conceptually, a
foreign-relations concern ninety years after The Chinese Exclusion
Case.  In Narenji v. Civiletti, a D.C. Court of Appeals case, Iranian
non-citizens challenged an alien registration regulation issued in
response to the Iran-Contra Affair.26  The U.S. Attorney General
argued that it is “an element of the language of diplomacy by
which international courtesies are granted or withdrawn in re-
sponse to actions by foreign countries.”27  The intent or desire of
the regulated individual to remain in the United States is immate-
rial by virtue of his or her non-citizen status.28  Circuit Judge
George MacKinnon, in his concurrence, wrote:
22 BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 13–18 (Tem-
ple University Press 2004).
23 130 U.S. 581, 603–4, 609 (1889)  (“Jurisdiction over its own territory to that
extent is an incident of every independent nation.  It is a part of its independence.  If
it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another
power.”).
24 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25 HENKIN, supra note 16, at 16.
26 Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
27 Id. at 748.
28 Cf. IRA. J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 773 (11th ed. Am. Immigr.
Law Found. 2008); see Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 101(a)(15),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i); (a)(15)(M)(i); (a)(15)(O)(ii)(IV); (a)(15)(P);
(a)(15)(Q) (2006) (specifying that an “immigrant” does not include a person “having
a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning” or a per-
son “having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning.”).
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Though the resident alien may be personally loyal to the United
States, if his nation becomes our enemy his allegiance prevails
over his personal preference and makes him also our enemy,
liable to expulsion or internment. . . . That aliens remain vulner-
able to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles
with severities.  But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal con-
firmed by international law as a power inherent in every sover-
eign state.29
The U.S. registration requirement applied to several thousand Ira-
nian students,30 and the subsequent deportation of a significant
number of these students was thus considered a wholly diplomatic
move.31
States are also generally prohibited from setting new immigra-
tion standards and policies.  The Supreme Court, in Hines v. David-
owitz, held that federal preemption in immigration matters meant
that states cannot impose additional restrictions on non-citizen re-
sidents unless they pertain to an area within states’ constitutionally
delegated powers.32 Hines struck down a Pennsylvania law requir-
ing aliens to register annually with the Department of Labor and
show a specific card whenever demanded by a police officer or
state labor official; failure to do so would result in a fine or impris-
onment.33  Underlying the Court’s activism was its concern that the
Pennsylvania statute directly conflicted with federal policies articu-
lated during passage of Congress’s Alien Registration Act, through
which federal officials sought “to protect the personal liberties of
law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration sys-
tem, and to leave them free from the possibility of inquisitorial
practices and police surveillance that might not only affect our in-
ternational relations but might also generate the very disloyalty
which the law has intended guarding against.”34  Unlike the Alien
Registration Act, however, the REAL ID Act clearly evinces Con-
gress’ intent (albeit only through a maneuver that avoided a full
floor vote on the bill as a stand-alone measure) that states play a
29 Narenji, 617 F.2d at 749 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
586–88(1951)).
30 Id. at 748.
31 See, e.g., Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding the deporta-
tion of an Iranian student for failing to comply with the new regulation discussed in
Narenji); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INS, 1979 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMI-
GRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Tables 24A and 24B (1980) (indicating 484
Iranians required to depart, and 41 Iranians deported, although basis for departure
not noted).
32 Hines, 312 U.S. at 52.
33 Id. at 59.
34 Id. at 74.
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role in screening out and excluding non-citizens, even if denying
them licenses under REAL ID’s regime may result in fines, impris-
onment, or deportation.35  The distinct political climates in our na-
tion in 1941 and 2005 bear legally on the question of whether
immigration federalism requires federal preemption of state immi-
gration enforcement activities beyond the literal, textual require-
ments of the REAL ID Act to deny licenses to large classes of non-
citizens.
If anything, the Supreme Court has cautioned the judicial
branch to exercise judicial deference to the federal executive in mat-
ters of immigration law because of federalism concerns.  In Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy, Justice Jackson wrote:
Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican
form of government.  Such matters are so exclusively entrusted
to the political branches of government as to be largely immune
from judicial inquiry or interference.36
Federal exclusivity within the context of immigration power ends
where the Court is dealing with “matters firmly within a State’s con-
stitutional prerogatives.”37  Even then, the state need only justify its
classification by a showing of some rational relationship between
the state’s goals and the classification.38
Thus, for more than a century, U.S. immigration policy has
been characterized by “immigration federalism,” in which immigra-
tion decision-making and implementation rests solely at the federal
level.  “Immigration federalism” jurisprudence has only recently
begun to respond to attempts by the Executive Branch to deputize
states into regulating non-citizens and their movements.
II. THE REAL ID ACT AND THE RESURGENCE OF STATE
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY
Other provisions within the REAL ID Act sought to clamp
down on immigration through other first-in-kind amendments.  In
addition to nationalizing standards for driver’s licenses and other
IDs issued by state departments of motor vehicles, the key provi-
sions of the REAL ID Act also waived laws barring construction of
35 See discussion infra Part II.C.
36 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936)).
37 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
38 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978).
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physical barriers at U.S. borders, modified asylum law to impose
more rigorous standards for proving asylum claims, and defined
issues related to terrorism.39  By imposing the driver’s license re-
quirements upon the states, the REAL ID Act purposefully sought
to expand the role that states would play in assisting the federal
government in disrupting and dislocating non-citizens without law-
ful presence in the United States.
A. Congress Demands Uniformity of State Licensing Standards
Under the Act, states must implement new eligibility criteria
restricting the issuance of driver’s licenses to U.S. citizens and cer-
tain categories of legally present non-citizens and temporary re-
sidents.40  To be in compliance with the Act, states must verify the
validity of each document proving an applicant’s identity, includ-
ing immigration documents, by consulting DHS databases and the
Social Security Administration database.41  The state would also
have to issue different licenses for U.S. citizens and non-citizens,
such that the non-citizens’ licenses must indicate that they are tem-
porary licenses valid only during the period of time the applicant is
authorized to stay in the United States or, if there is no definite
end to the period of authorized stay, a period of one year.42  As a
result, the expiration date of the license would, in the majority of
cases, also indicate the date on which the holder’s lawful presence
in the United States is believed to end.  The Act also requires the
states to maintain and share their motorist databases with each
other,43 a measure that privacy advocates oppose on the grounds
that it will lead to the creation of a national ID card system.
However, a state’s “compliance” with the REAL ID Act driver’s
license requirements is only optional on its face.  If a state fails to
39 REAL ID Act of 2005, 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2005).  REAL ID’s detailed licensing
requirements are curiously codified in full within this “Definitions” section of the fed-
eral statutory scheme.
40 Id.  REAL ID’s list of approved non-citizens excludes vulnerable groups such as
persons granted withholding of removal or withholding of deportation; persons pa-
roled into the United States; applicants for nonimmigrant visas (such as trafficking
victims); Cuban/Haitian entrants paroled in the United States; certain battered
spouses and their children, and battered children and their parents; persons granted
Family Unity status; persons granted deferred enforced departure  status; applicants
for suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal; and persons under an order
of supervision.  Joan Friedland, Final REAL ID Regulations Fail to Ease New Burdens
on Immigrants, IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS UPDATE, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.nilc.org/
immspbs/DLs/DL039.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
41 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006).
42 Id.
43 Id.
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or decides not to comply with the REAL ID Act minimum require-
ments before certain deadlines, its residents may not use their state
DMV-issued cards for “any federal purpose,” including boarding
commercial airplanes, accessing federal courts, and using any
other federal facilities.44
DHS, the agency responsible for implementing REAL ID, is-
sued final regulations in January 2009 that permit each state to ap-
ply for extensions if it can “demonstrat[e] material compliance
with the core requirements of the Act and this rule” within three
and one-half years; states must be in “material compliance” with
REAL ID’s requirements by January 1, 2010 to receive an addi-
tional extension until no later than May 10, 2011.45  By December
1, 2014, federal agencies will require all individuals under fifty
years of age to present a “REAL ID” if that state-issued ID is being
used for official purposes.46  (However, individuals aged fifty or
older would have a grace period of three years in which to apply
for and receive a REAL ID from their state.)47
Contrary to the government’s claim that REAL ID’s licensing
requirements are voluntary and not coercive, the 2009 regulations
clearly require that states that choose not to comply with the REAL
ID Act must nevertheless “ensure that such license or identification
card—(A) clearly states on its face that it may not be accepted by
any Federal agency for identification or any other official purpose;
and (B) uses a unique design or color indicator to alert Federal
agency and other law enforcement personnel that it may not be
accepted for any such purpose.”48  Essentially, states that choose to
opt out of DHS’s campaign to implement REAL ID are still told
what their licenses must look like if they wish for their residents to
enter any space maintained under federal jurisdiction.
Finally, if any states choose to resist complying with the REAL
ID’s putatively non-coercive licensing requirements—as several
states have already declared they would do—it would reveal the
REAL ID Act’s fundamental design flaw and undercut the basic,
rational basis of Congress’ intent: to implement a “uniform” na-
tionwide licensing system and a restrictive fifty-state database.
44 Id.
45 REAL ID Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards, 6 C.F.R § 37.51 (2008).
46 6 C.F.R § 37.27 (2008).
47 Id.
48 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006).
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B. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and “Enhanced Driver’s
Licenses”(“EDLs”)
Under the Department of Homeland Security, the REAL ID
Act has also absorbed implementation of a related mandate, the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (“WHTI”), under which
states are encouraged to adopt new quasi-federal roles.  In 2004,
Congress authorized the WHTI to goad border states into creating
hybrid ID cards resembling both driver’s licenses and passports
known as “enhanced driver’s licenses,” while ending the practice of
allowing U.S. and foreign travelers coming from Canada, the Car-
ibbean, Bermuda, and Mexico to pass customs without showing
proof of identity and nationality.49  After January 2008, all such
travelers must produce a passport or document or combination of
documents deemed by DHS to “sufficiently denote both identity
and citizenship.”50  DHS has warned border states that implemen-
tation of new rules under WHTI would create new burdens upon
tourism and border-state trade unless those states collaborated with
federal officials to develop and issue EDLs.51
The statute that established the WHTI appears to provide se-
ries of safeguards passed to prevent terrorists from entering the
United States.  It called for an end to the practice of waiving the
requirement to show documentation by tourists and travelers to
the United States from North American and Caribbean destina-
tions, and requires the implementation of a plan that nevertheless
expedites the border-crossing of frequent travelers.52  However,
DHS has seized upon the law to leverage state buy-in and imple-
mentation of REAL ID standards by appealing to border states in
their traditional de facto capacity of regulating national borders.53
As a result, two states that previously had publicly and vigorously
49 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
Title VII, § 7209, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3823 (2004), amended by Pub. L. 109-295,
Title V, § 546, Oct. 4, 2006, 120 Stat. 1383 (2006); Pub. L. 110-53, Title VII, § 723,
Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 349 (2007).
50 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 7209(c)(2) (2004).
51 NCSL Congressional Testimony 2008, supra note 10, at 8.
52 Card Format Passport, Changes to Passport Fee Schedule, 72 Fed. Reg.
74169–01 (Dec. 31, 2007) (“[IRTPA] requires that the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) and the Department of State seek to facilitate the frequent travel of
those living in border communities.”).
53 For example, states and local authorities have entered into agreements with for-
eign authorities to coordinate “roads, police cooperation, and border control” after
the Supreme Court held in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), that such state
agreements only require Congressional consent where they tend to increase the polit-
ical power of the states vis-a`-vis the federal government. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 155.
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opposed to complying with REAL ID—New York54 and Washing-
ton55—have joined the ranks of border states Michigan, Vermont,
and Arizona, in implementing an EDL pilot program for its re-
sidents.  Coincidentally, EDL compliance requires state agencies to
implement measures that exceed the already stringent require-
ments of the REAL ID Act in two aspects: 1) EDLs may only be
issued to U.S. citizens; and 2) EDLs will implement radio-frequency
identification technology, an even more developed technology
than the two-dimensional bar code.  Thus, compliance with WHTI
will bring a state significantly closer to compliance with the REAL
ID Act.56
Immigration advocates have argued that EDL requirements, as
in REAL ID, impose upon states an unnecessary “redundancy” and
raise constitutional concerns regarding federal preemption be-
cause WHTI deals with the issue of documenting citizenship and
applying federal immigration laws.57
C. Federal “Deputization” of States: Driving Immigrants Underground
After a decade of false starts, the federal government has
made a concerted effort after 9/11 to use its plenary power over
immigration to expand the role that states may play in assisting
with federal immigration enforcement.  Initiatives such as the
REAL ID Act and DHS’s section 287(g) program deputizing local
police to enforce immigration laws have signaled a modern resur-
gence of states’ and localities’ involvement in directly restricting
immigration, rather than indirectly through areas of traditional
state authority such as punitive criminal, housing, and public bene-
fits laws focused on immigrant residents.
The REAL ID Act arguably “deputizes” states to engage in the
screening and classification of immigrants in three ways:  (1)
DHS’s final regulations for REAL ID require states that refuse to
54 See Jennifer 8. Lee, A New License, for More Than Just Driving, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17,
2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/a-new-license-for-more-than-
just-driving.
55 NCSL Congressional Testimony 2008, supra note 10, at 5.
56 See TATELMAN, supra note 8, at 32 (noting “some EDLs will comply with REAL
ID, but not all REAL IDs will qualify as WHTI-compliant EDLs.”); NCSL Congressional
Testimony 2008, supra note 10, at 8 (warning that “DHS seems to conflate REAL ID and
WHTI, blurring lines between the programs, and encouraging states who have legisla-
tively opposed REAL ID to implement REAL ID by way of WHTI-compliant IDs.”).
57 Ensuring Homeland Security While Facilitating Legitimate Travel: The Challenge at
America’s Ports of Entry, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 9
(2007) (statement of Kathleen Campbell Walker, Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass’n), availa-
ble at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080103121523-96130.pdf.
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comply with the REAL ID Act to nevertheless abide by federal re-
quirements of a color or design that it is distinct from REAL ID-
compliant licenses, thus raising suspicions against residents of such
a state traveling interstate; (2) the final regulations require that all
holders of REAL-ID-compliant temporary licenses (i.e., a substan-
tial number of immigrant licensees) to renew in person at DMV
offices, but waives this requirement for permanent U.S. residents;58
(3) the final regulations vaguely require a state to “refer” non-citi-
zen license applicants who may be out-of-status to a DHS agency:
“In the event of a non-match in the Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlements (“SAVE”) database, the DMV must not issue a
REAL ID driver’s license or identification card to an applicant, and
must refer the individual to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for
resolution.”59
Under the last regulatory mandate, there is no guarantee that
an individual identified by a state DMV as potentially unlawfully
present or out-of-status would not be reported to DHS’s enforce-
ment agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
The law’s silence with respect to what a state employee may or may
not do with individuals whose information is rejected by DHS
databases means that interactions within a REAL ID-compliant
state with other state authorities may be left up to inexpert state
discretion and result in a “function creep” that may lead to tragic
results.60  State officials at the DMV or other agencies, without ad-
ditional guidance or accountability guidelines, may feel compelled
to act in a personal or official capacity to notify DHS about un-
documented immigrants who present themselves, as has been in-
creasingly documented in recent years through the section 287(g)
program and state copycat initiatives.
The actions of state executives who took their cues from con-
gressional talk about the REAL ID Act offer a glimpse of what may
come if state legislatures choose to implement REAL ID licensing.
In New York, Governor George Pataki ordered the state DMV to
deny licenses for undocumented immigrants in 2004, months prior
to the enactment of REAL ID.61  Its impact upon a state with un-
documented immigrants became immediately apparent.  A Korean
immigrant worker who continued to make his newspaper delivery
rounds—despite losing his driver’s license after Pataki imple-
58 6 C.F.R. § 37.21 (2008).
59 6 C.F.R. § 37.13(b)(1) (2008) (emphasis added).
60 See notes 61–64 infra and accompanying text.
61 Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Group to Sue State Over License Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2004, at B5.
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mented new exclusionary DMV policies—was pulled over for a mi-
nor traffic violation and thereafter deported.62  In Queens, New
York, an otherwise law-abiding Bangladeshi immigrant mother re-
ported to a DMV office, in response to a letter suspending her li-
cense based on a Social Security number mismatch, was arrested
and ultimately deported by ICE after what she believed was a tip
from DMV employees.63
In 2007, New Jersey’s Attorney General Anne Milgram issued a
policy requiring local police to interrogate individuals arrested for
certain crimes about their immigration status and to report out-of-
status persons to immigration authorities.64  Eight months later,
such referrals to DHS doubled from 4,589 to 8,874, including one
undocumented immigrant passenger (i.e., not a driver) from Mex-
ico who was arrested after police observed the car he was riding in
fail to stop at a stop sign and then asked all of the car’s occupants
to produce identification.65  It is therefore entirely possible to pre-
dict how a state or locality’s overbroad interrogation policy would
coordinate with REAL ID implementation if New Jersey were to
comply with REAL ID Act’s licensing regulations.66
In addition to REAL ID, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), as
predecessor to DHS, developed agreements under section 287(g)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act after the 9/11 attacks to
deputize local law enforcement authorities to investigate, appre-
hend, and detain undocumented residents.67  As of November 17,
62 Kelly Smith, Group Wants DMV to Stay out of Immigration Enforcement Business, THE
LEGISLATIVE GAZETTE.COM, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.legislativegazette.com/read_
more.php?story=999 (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
63 See generally Arthur J. Pais, Undocumented Immigrants in New York to Get Drivers’
Licenses, INDIA ABROAD, Oct. 5, 2007, at A8; Driver’s Licenses for All in NY, http://
malangbaba.blogspot.com/2007/09/drivers-licenses-for-all.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2007).  In 2005, as a community organizer, I worked in coalition with the Jackson
Heights-based advocacy group Desis Rising Up and Moving (“DRUM”) on a campaign
opposing state compliance with the REAL ID Act, during which Shilpi Thakur’s story
comprised legislative testimony.
64 Kareem Fahim, Immigration Referrals by Police Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2008, at A21.
65 Id.
66 In Danbury, Conn., a federal lawsuit alleges that the mayor and police chief
have implemented a discriminatory city policy in which police officers engage in traf-
fic stops for the purpose of investigating the immigration status of Latino drivers, by
conducting a search for drivers’ names on the FBI’s National Crime Information
Center database and arresting drivers if any civil immigration violations are discov-
ered.  Compl. ¶ 151, Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07-CV-01436 (D. Ct. Conn. Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/chdocs/barrera-complaint.pdf.
67 Liz Boch, Rogers Panel Debates Plan for Police Training: Enforcing Immigration Laws
at Issue, AK DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 2007.
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2008, ICE has active agreements with 63 local law enforcement
agencies in 20 states.68  ICE reports that the program has, since
January 2006, led to the identification of more than 70,000 individ-
uals “suspected of being in the country illegally.”69  After entering
into a section 287(g) agreement, Maricopa County, Arizona Sheriff
Joe Arpaio has sent officers through Latino neighborhoods, pull-
ing cars over for broken taillights or turn-signal violations, check-
ing drivers’ and passengers’ papers and arresting scores of
undocumented immigrants.70  After receiving months of com-
plaints, DOJ launched a civil rights investigation of the police de-
partment, focusing on “patterns or practices of discriminatory
police practices and unconstitutional searches and seizures.”71  The
section 287(g) deputization program actively encourages states and
localities to opt into immigration enforcement without providing
protections against racial profiling and other forms of discrimina-
tory harassment.
D. Stemming the Tide, or Extinguishing State Experimentation?
Groups that oppose expanding—or more accurately, restor-
ing—immigrants’ eligibility for driver’s licenses largely believe that
REAL ID’s measures can play a key role in deterring and disrupting
undocumented immigrant populations.72  Prior efforts over the
past decade similar to REAL-ID had explicitly sought—but failed—
to use of state’s licensing of motorists to uproot non-citizens.  In
1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”) requiring states to include So-
cial Security numbers on driver’s licenses; the provision was
68 U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, Delegation of Immigration Authority
Section 287(g): Immigration and Nationality Act (2008), available at http://www.ice.
gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
69 Id.
70 Editorial, Immigration, Outsourced, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/opinion/09wed1.html.
71 Daniel Gonza´lez, Arpaio to Be Investigated Over Alleged Violations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Mar. 11, 2009, at 1.
72 E.g., “All illegal aliens shall be barred from access to . . . driver’s licenses and
identification cards. Under federal law, illegal aliens are barred from forming the
requisite legal intent to establish state domicile or residency under state law.”  Fed’n
for Am. Immigr. Reform, Guiding Principles for Driver’s License Reforms, Apr. 2003,
http://www.fairus.org/site/News2?page=newsArticle&id=16904 (last visited Nov. 10,
2008). See also James Jay Carafano, Heritage Found., Immigration Amendments Under-
mine REAL ID and Workplace Enforcement (2007), available at http://www.heritage.org/
research/immigration/upload/wm_1516.pdf (“Eliminating REAL ID requirements
now, in the midst of a national debate on strengthening border security and immigra-
tion law enforcement, makes no sense.”).
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repealed four years later on account of privacy concerns and fears
that it would create a national ID card.73  Nevertheless, IIRAIRA
included a provision permitting states to conduct a pilot program
for denying drivers’ licenses to the undocumented.74  Private actors
such as employers responded to immigration reform measures that
increased the use of driver’s licenses as proof of identity acceptable
for employment,75 especially after the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act, which for the first time in U.S. history prohibited
the hiring of undocumented immigrants.76
Unlike the section 287(g) deputization program, the REAL ID
Act licensing regime is the first fifty-state attempt by the U.S. fed-
eral government to undermine the relief that states may provide to
immigrants under a “steam valve” theory.  Professor Peter J. Spiro
proposed a “steam-valve” theory to describe how states “desiring
stricter enforcement of immigration laws could pursue that objec-
tive without imposing their preference on states in which immigra-
tion might be considered a neutral or positive factor” because it
would be better for aliens “to be driven from a hostile California to
a receptive New York than to be shut out of the United States alto-
gether.”77  Spiro’s theory, however, might be updated to address
the limits of perceived long-term relief within states given the polit-
ical incentive of local and state officials anywhere to propose, pass,
or simply announce their preferences regarding federal immigra-
tion policy as an explicit overture to voters to elect them to federal
office, as may have been the case with New York’s Governor
Pataki.78  The REAL ID Act’s logic rests on its ability to extinguish
“sanctuary” cities, states, and other sub-federal political divisions.
From an immigrant advocate’s perspective, the REAL ID Act
countermands many states’ and localities’ efforts to integrate immi-
grants within their populace, such as expanding employment op-
portunities and protections for immigrants, by operating as a
measure to curb the social and economic mobility of non-citizens
73 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 656(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-716-18 (1996), repealed by
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 355, 113 Stat. 986, 1027 (2000).
74 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 502.
75 Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of
Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L. J. 213, 227 (2004).
76 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Ex-
periment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193 (2007).
77 Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627,
1635–36 (1997) (generally promoting the “virtues” of immigration federalism).
78 See Bernstein, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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such as the undocumented.79  The natural arc of such a program is
the exclusion of immigrants from more than just roadways, and the
multiplication of border line-drawing within states themselves.
REAL ID, if implemented, excludes undocumented immigrants
from a wide range of economic and social activity in which a
driver’s license serves as a vital identification function: opening a
bank account,80 purchasing a home,81 renting an apartment,82 ac-
cessing financial credit,83 and traveling by major alternative modes
of transportation.84  Ubiquitous demands for their presentation
render what is legally considered a “privilege” into a deprivation of
necessities, geographic segregation, and the denial of an identity
for many immigrants.
Because 86% of all trips within the United States are made by
car, loss of driving privileges can make it difficult or nearly impossi-
ble for individuals to keep their jobs, reach a hospital during an
emergency, and participate in public activities.85  Myriad driving-
dependent job opportunities, including taxi and livery, trucking,
delivery, and parking services, will vanish, along with jobs in subur-
ban and rural areas that are only accessible by car.  In some states,
any individuals who insist on driving unlicensed as undocumented
immigrants risk arrest and criminal sanctions and, in most in-
stances, deportation.86
Some legal scholars have argued that the past two decades of
79 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2079
(2008) (“Unauthorized migrants then lack access to the autonomous spheres created
by private actors in which they might otherwise be able to live. In short, these mea-
sures limit the number and size of the communities to which immigrants without
lawful status can belong.”).
80 Nina Bernstein, Routine Check on License Can Mean Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2005, at B1.
81 Id.
82 Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 87–90 (noting a
practice among landlords of attempting to ascertain a prospective tenant’s legal sta-
tus, especially in localities with anti-immigrant housing ordinances and potential Fair
Housing Act violations attending such inquiries).
83 Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Aliens” in our Midst Post-9/11: Legislat-
ing Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1719 (2005).
84 See Amtrak: Passenger Identification, http://www.amtrak.com (in Search en-
gine, type “passenger identification”) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); Greyhound: Tickets
& Travel Info, http://www.greyhound.com/HOME/en/TicketsAndTravel/Tickets
AndTravelInfo.aspx, (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (requiring all reserved-seat “will call”
ticket holders to proffer valid photo ID).
85 MELISSA SAVAGE AND JAMES B. REED, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS OF LOSING A DRIVER’S LICENSE 1 (Nov./Dec. 2008).
86 Johnson, supra note 75, at 224–25; but see John K. Blake, Examining Louisiana’s
Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways Act, 35 S. U. L. REV. 223, 244–45 (2007) (discuss-
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immigration reform have required activists to extol the virtues of
clear-cut federalism, and in the alternative, localism, in immigra-
tion policy where it comes to demographic expertise and experi-
mentation.87  Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan has argued that the
Rehnquist Court’s revival of federalism, and the elevation of judi-
cial intervention on behalf of states’ rights, protects opportunities
for states or localities to engage in social experimentation for
projects that would not be viable at the national level: from legaliz-
ing same-sex marriage to authorizing physician-assisted suicide.88
Professor Clare Huntington suggests that allowing for a range of
immigration regulation (perhaps even where state policies conflict
with federal law and would not exist but for the grace of federal
inaction) “would let other countries know that there is a diversity
of opinion among U.S. citizens with regard to non-citizens.”89
After REAL ID, the absence of a driver’s license is certain to
arouse suspicions that an individual is undocumented, and will
have certain effects documented under section 287(g): discourag-
ing immigrant individuals and households from contacting the po-
lice, even as witnesses to a crime,90 and increased racial profiling by
police of “foreign-looking” citizens and non-citizens alike.91  Some
ing a statute, since found to be preempted by federal law, making operation of a
motor vehicle in the state as an immigrant without lawful presence a crime).
87 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 17.
88 Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism after
the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 801–802 (2006).  Sullivan notes that the
Court’s other doctrines continue to operate as limits on state power such as: (1) de-
clining to revive the notion that “state autonomy over traditional and integral govern-
mental functions that are absolutely immunized from federal control”; (2) Congress
could condition its spending on the states contingent to states’ conformity with Con-
gressional goals rationally related to the spending; (3) declining to overrule Ex parte
Young suits against state officials; and (4) declining to roll back the Dormant Com-
merce Clause’s bar against state regulations injurious to interstate commerce even
when Congress has not expressly preempted them. Id. at 805–08.
89 Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 837 (2008).
90 Monica Varsanyi, Should Cops Be La Migra? Most U.S. Police Chiefs Don’t Want the
Job of Enforcing Immigration Laws, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at 9 (discussing a national
survey in which approximately three in four police chiefs who considered but decided
against training officers to do immigration duty did so out of “a concern that it would
decrease overall public safety because undocumented residents, fearing deportation,
would be less likely to contact the police if they were a victim of, or witness to, a
crime.”)
91 See, e.g., BASSINA FARBENBLUM & JESSICA JANSYN, CTR. FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, SETON
HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, CROSSING THE LINE: DAMAGING IMMIGRATION EN-
FORCEMENT PRACTICES BY NEW JERSEY POLICE  FOLLOWING ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW EN-
FORCEMENT DIRECTIVE 2007-3 (2009) available at http://law.shu.edu/csj/crossing_
the_line.pdf (analyzing data from 68 incidents from 2008–2009 indicating racial pro-
filing of Latino drivers, pedestrians and even a train station patron, all of whom police
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cities and police departments have instituted policies that prohibit
city employees, such as police officers, from inquiring about an in-
dividual’s immigration status.92  If the resurgence of states’ involve-
ment in immigration issues through traditional state functions
continues apace without federal checks and safeguards, state offi-
cials across an array of agencies will likely otherwise receive a great
deal of latitude in implementation.  Given developments in the
states of New York, New Jersey, and Arizona—among other states
and localities—it will inevitably produce state practices permitting
or officially sanctioning local officials to directly engage in discrimi-
natory and racist actions against state residents who may appear
“foreign.”
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE REAL ID ACT
There are currently no special equal-protection prohibitions
against discriminatory actions that target non-citizens and undocu-
mented immigrants under current case law, although some legal
analysts have voiced concerns regarding post-REAL ID barriers to
the substantive fundamental right to travel of both citizens and
non-citizens.93  Instead, the residual nature of states’ authority over
its non-citizen residents renders Tenth Amendment challenges to
REAL ID concerning federalism and political accountability for
failures of such congressionally imposed policies more likely to suc-
ceed.  International human rights instruments may also be persua-
sive, but they may not be considered binding upon U.S. courts.
A. Equal Protection Challenges
Equal protection law currently does not protect undocu-
mented immigrants as a “suspect class” that requires a court’s ac-
tive protection.  In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court affirmed the
right of undocumented children to receive public education
turned over to immigration authorities); Daniel Gonza´lez, Citizens Claim Profiling, Join
Suit Against Arpaio, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 17, 2008, at 1 (reporting Ariz. Sheriff Joe
Arpaio’s deputies asked Latino U.S. citizens to show a Social Security card, driver’s
license, registration, and insurance, but did not ask for documentation of other driv-
ers at roadblock); Paul Pupura, La. Law on Foreign Drivers Tossed: Judge Says It Pre-empts
U.S. Immigration Law, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 2, 2007, at 2 (reporting a U.S. citizen’s
challenge to a new state statute, under which she was criminally charged with driving
without lawful immigration status).
92 E.g., Los Angeles Police Department, Office of the Chief of Police, Special Or-
der No. 40, Undocumented Aliens (Nov. 27, 1979), www.judicialwatch.org/archive/
2006/so40-gates.pdf; New York City Office of the Mayor Executive Order 41(Sept. 17,
2003), www.nyc.gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/exe_order_41.pdf.
93 TATELMAN, supra note 8, at 8–9.
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funded by the state of Texas despite finding they did not constitute
a “suspect class” because a state effort to bar undocumented immi-
grant children from the classroom was irrational in its clear effect
of producing illiterate and “stigmatized” students.94  An argument
that federal or state implementation of the REAL ID Act or similar
DMV policies violates the equal protection guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the undocumented, on account of the
stigma of not being able to carry state-issued identification, has yet
to be successfully litigated.95  One weakness underlying either a
“stigma” or “burden” argument is that under REAL ID, individuals
are not prohibited from using an international or foreign license
to drive within the states, or using consular identification or pass-
ports as identification for travel or other purposes.
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit held in League of United Latin Ameri-
cans Citizens v. Bredesen that a Tennessee statute that denied driver’s
licenses to any applicants who were not U.S. citizens or lawful per-
manent residents, and permitted only driving “certificates” to tem-
porary residents with lawful presence, did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.96  Thus, unlike Plyler, the suspect class involved
immigrants with temporary status, not the undocumented.  The
court applied rational-basis scrutiny and found that Tennessee’s in-
terest in not vouching for the identity of aliens who had not been
granted lawful permanent status was rationally supported by the
statute’s DMV policy.97  Furthermore, the court rejected the plain-
tiffs’ claim that denial of a driver’s license burdened their funda-
mental right to travel because the court failed to find any authority
for the proposition that lawful temporary resident aliens enjoy the
same fundamental right to travel as U.S. citizens, and also found
that the state’s issuance of alternative “certificates” did not imper-
missibly burden plaintiff’s movements.98
B. A Potential Tenth Amendment Challenge Asserting States’ Rights
Three years after the passage of the REAL ID Act, a Delaware
94 457 U.S. 202, 222–24 (1982).
95 See, e.g., Cubas v. Martinez, 870 N.E.2d 133 (2007).  The New York State Court of
Appeals held that the state DMV’s pre-REAL ID Act policy requiring proof of identity
establishing, among other things, lawful presence did not violate the equal protection
rights of the undocumented immigrants as a class because the classification only drew
a line between those who can present DHS documentation along with a Social Secur-
ity letter, and those who cannot. Id. at 619.
96 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir.
2007).
97 Id. at 533–34.
98 Id. at 535.
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lawmaker representing the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures frankly testified before Congress that “REAL ID substituted
coercive federalism for collaborative federalism.”99  For states, the
controversy over the REAL ID Act appears to strain the “dual sover-
eignty” federalism framework the Supreme Court articulated in
Printz v. United States, for reasons beyond the issues involved in
shared immigration power.100  Dual sovereignty allows states to
maintain their near-exclusive jurisdiction over certain issues and
provides each citizen with “two political capacities, one state and
one federal.”101  REAL ID’s rules impermissibly “commandeer” and
coerce states to serve federal objectives, an unconstitutional en-
croachment by the federal government under the Tenth
Amendment.102
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Tenth Amendment as an independent constraint on Congress’s
power over states in their sovereign capacity.  The Court held that a
federal statute requiring states to either take title of radioactive
waste or regulate according to Congress’s instructions was
unconstitutional:
Either type of federal action would ‘commandeer’ state govern-
ments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would
for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of
authority between federal and state governments.  On the other
hand, the second alternative held out to state governments—
regulating pursuant to Congress’ direction—would, standing
alone, present a simple command to state governments to im-
plement legislation enacted by Congress. As we have seen, the
Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state gov-
ernments to this type of instruction.103
Similarly, in Printz v. United States, the Court struck down a
Brady Bill provision that required state chief law enforcement offi-
cials conduct background checks of handgun purchasers in order
99 NCSL Congressional Testimony 2008, supra note 10, at 6.
100 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
101 Id. at 920, (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
102 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (“As an initial matter, Con-
gress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”) (quoting Ho-
del v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).  For a de-
tailed analysis regarding the unconstitutionality of the REAL ID Act under New York
and Printz, see Michael J. Allen, A Choice That Leaves No Choice: Unconstitutional Coercion
Under REAL ID, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 231, 243–56 (2008).
103 New York, 505 U.S. at 175–176.
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to execute federal law.104  Quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice Scalia
noted that the dual-sovereignty system reduces the “risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front.”105  For example, where Congress
forces state governments to bear the financial costs and implemen-
tation of a federal regulatory program, then budgetary issues and
political accountability of any excessively “burdensome” or “defec-
tive” federal laws would unfairly fall upon the states.106  The REAL
ID Act has been characterized as both unwieldy and defective.
Implementing the REAL ID Act will impact all fifty-six U.S. ju-
risdictions and more than 240 million applicants for and holders of
state DMV-issued IDs.107  The non-profit American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators estimated that DMV workloads will
increase by 132% and that transaction times for license renewals
will double.108  DHS most recently estimated that it will cost the
states $3.9 billion to implement the program over eleven years, in-
cluding $970 million in customer service, and $953 million to pro-
duce and issue the cards.109  These costs appear to be primarily
borne by the states, with the exception of a few limited federal
grants for states to transition their infrastructure and link their
databases.110
Licensing drivers is a traditional state function under its po-
lice, health, and safety powers.  DHS itself conceded in remarks
accompanying the final regulations for REAL ID that states possess
“autonomy to govern an inherently State function—the driver’s li-
cense issuance process.”111  DHS responded to state-sovereignty
concerns from the comment period by simply ignoring Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence through a vague, possibly inaccurate
statement in light of the strict regulations it issued for implementa-
tion: “DHS has welcomed and encouraged State participation in
this process and, where possible, drafted these rules in such a way
as to maximize State discretion.”112
Although states have the option not to comply with REAL ID,
they risk having their residents forced to use IDs other than their
104 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
105 Id. at 921.
106 Id. at 930.
107 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable
by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5286 (Jan. 29, 2008).
108 Id.
109 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable
by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5324–25 (Jan. 29, 2008).
110 2008 NCSL Congressional Testimony, supra note 10, at 2.
111 73 Fed. Reg. 5284 (Jan. 29, 2008).
112 Id.
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state-issued IDs for boarding planes and accessing courthouses.
The REAL ID Act’s recently-issued implementing regulations re-
quire states that do not comply—for reasons of federalism, privacy,
or immigrants’ rights concerns—nevertheless change the appear-
ance of their states’ DMV-issued IDs to indicate that they are not in
compliance and therefore unavailable to be used for federal pur-
poses.  Imposing such requirements upon states whether or not
they comply with the licensing regulations would violate the Tenth
Amendment.  State officials face the real possibility of U.S. citizens
who comprise their electorate encountering significant barriers in
the exercise of their right to travel—a “privilege and immunity of
national citizenship under the Constitution”113—and their First
Amendment right to access to the courts,114 unless they sacrifice
their sovereignty.
The REAL ID Act requires states to implement the sheer ma-
jority of its regulatory scheme, also arguably in violation of the
Tenth Amendment.  In some states, requiring States to adopt the
practice of linking license expiration dates with an individual’s im-
migration status requires approval of the state legislature because
DHS admits it lacks the authority to directly mandate this
change.115  States that do comply must commit a significant
amount of resources to conduct immigration document verifica-
tions, including paying for each document validation query to DHS
databases, and have no discretion to use the exceptions process
outlined in DHS regulations to permit non-citizens to use alternate
documents to prove their lawful status in the United States and
thus alleviate the administrative burdens upon their residents.116
These two issues most directly interfere with a state’s exercise
of its sovereign capacity and would effectively “commandeer” state
legislatures in the service of a federal law, prohibited under New
York and Printz.  The REAL ID Act, which failed to pass Congress as
a standalone bill and imposed upon states without full debate, thus
113 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371) (1825); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1;
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114 An individual’s right of access to the courts has been protected under the First
Amendment’s “right to petition for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Moreover, advocates have pointed out that “[l]ack of a Real ID compliant license
would bar a citizen from a face-to-face meeting with his or her elected or appointed
government representatives,” also implicating right-to-petition concerns.  ACLU,
REAL ID SCORECARD 22, Jan. 17, 2001, available at http://www.aclu.org/images/
general/asset_upload_file162_33700.pdf.
115 73 Fed. Reg. 5299 (Jan. 29, 2008).
116 6 C.F.R. § 37.11 (2008).
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raises substantive Tenth Amendment concerns regarding federal
intrusion into state licensing and public safety, both traditional ar-
eas of state sovereignty.
C. REAL ID and Standards Expressed in International Conventions
More than half a century ago, the United States spearheaded
efforts to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
recognizes a “right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state.”117  However, although the U.N. General
Assembly ratified the declaration by proclamation, it is not a treaty
and thus not legally binding as there are technically no signatories
to the Declaration.118
Another international instrument, the U.N. International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, recognizes the “right to liberty of
movement in the territory of the State of employment and freedom
to choose their residence there.”119  However, the United States is
not a ratifying nation nor a signatory to the Convention.120  Even if
the United States had ratified it, the Convention permits a nation
to justify restricting a person’s movement if “necessary to protect
national security.”121
It has been suggested by Professors Raquel Aldana and Sylvia
Lazos Vargas that the REAL ID Act’s denial of driver’s licenses in-
fringes upon the right of every individual to be recognized as a
person under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
117 See Article 13 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/1810 at 71 (1948).
118 Douglas Cassell, The Globalization of Human Rights: Consciousness, Law, and Reality,
2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 6, 50 (2004) (noting Human Rights Commission Chair
Eleanor Roosevelt was instructed by the U.S. State Department to declare the Declara-
tion not binding upon the United States); The United Nations and Human Rights,
http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1774e.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2009).  However, Cas-
sell argues that with the first Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant
(collectively the International Bill of Human Rights), most of the rights named have
attained the status of customary international law, binding even on states not party to
the Covenants. Id. at 56. See also Fila´rtiga v. Pen˜a-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (noting that
the U.N. General Assembly declared that the U.N. Charter precepts embodied in the
Universal Declaration “constitute basic principles of international law.”) (citing
G.A.Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)) (emphasis added).
119 Article 39 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 266, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
120 See United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTS
Online.aspx?id=1 (click on “Title Search”; then type “Rights of All Migrant Workers”;
below Participants, select “See Details”).
121 Id.
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Rights (“ICCPR”), which has been ratified by the United States.122
Given the discussion above regarding the pervasive nature of
driver’s licenses as identification, there is an argument that states
have responsibility for implementing the ICCPR in its ratification
instrument.123  A major hurdle, however, is that the Senate de-
clared that “provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are
not self-executing” and therefore does not automatically become
binding U.S. domestic law.124
CONCLUSION
States that comply with REAL ID do so at the risk of losing the
only formal and accurate relationship they may have with poten-
tially hundreds of thousands of their residents who are undocu-
mented immigrants or immigrants who cannot, after reasonable
effort, substantiate their identity.  Where the federal government
has by infrastructural necessity abdicated its day-to-day interaction
with non-citizens, driving more than 13 million immigrants further
underground under the REAL ID Act has meant that the govern-
ment also loses the opportunity to form any relationship with non-
citizens actually present in the United States and to advance the
national security objectives it boldly articulated after 9/11.  As dis-
cussed earlier, the lack of any state-issued driver’s license may itself
become a scarlet letter that facilitates abuse outside of public view.
For non-citizens with lawful status, if states and the federal gov-
ernment sincerely desire to assimilate them, providing them with a
different, “temporary” license instantly brands them as outsiders.
In Texas, where the state has begun to issue vertically-oriented
driver’s IDs to such individuals, Edwin Palacio, a political asylee
from the Philippines who has resided in the United States since the
early 1990s, told a reporter that the new Texas rules have created
“confusion instead of clarity” and “suspicion instead of trust”: “ ‘I
strove to build a new life here,’ said Mr. Palacio, who works as an
information systems auditor in Austin.  ‘Imagine my shock, my dis-
may, my fear, to find that these rules . . . designated me a mere
122 Aldana & Lazos Vargas, supra note 83, at 1721–22 (2005); Article 16 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976 (“Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as
a person before the law.”).
123 S. Comm. on Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 652 (1992) (“Article 50 extends the provisions of
the Covenant to all parts of federal states.”).
124 138 CONG. REC. S4781–84 (1992).
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temporary visitor to the U.S.’”125
The ideological debates arising from a Tenth Amendment fed-
eralism analysis involving an immigrants’ rights issue is ripe for fu-
ture discussion, but it is worth noting here that states’ arguments
that Congress has overstepped its authority mainly focus on states’
fiscal burdens and on defects in REAL ID implementation—i.e.,
political responsibility to states in their sovereign capacity—while
the interstitial jurisdictional vacuums in our nation’s current immi-
gration federalism framework do not place state voters and non-
voting non-citizens on equal footing. The provision of additional
federal funds and flexibility in REAL ID Act implementation, for
example, will not cure the law of its significant immigration feder-
alism concerns.  This Article is an initial step to theoretically con-
nect the behavior of self-interested state officials with an ethos of
non-discrimination toward non-voting immigrant populations.  In
2009, it remains to be seen whether President Barack Obama and
a new Congress take up this opportunity for lawmakers to re-
examine whether an ill-conceived and poorly designed act of Con-
gress is legally sound, materially feasible, and politically
accountable.
125 Emily Ramshaw, Opponents Call New Driver’s License Rules for Foreign Nationals ‘In-
stitutionalized Racism,’ DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008, available at www.dallas
news.com (search “Emily Ramshaw and Driver’s Licenses,” then click on article title
hyperlink).
